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"The Speech We Hate": First Amendment
Totalism, the ACLU, and the Principle of
Dialogic Politics
Richard Delgado* & David Yun**
PREAMBLE
The two of us were pleased to read Professor Charles Calleros' article,
Paternalism, Counterspeech, and Campus Hate-Speech Codes: A Reply to
Delgado and Yun, which the Arizona State Law Journal editors were kind
enough to advance. Responding to two articles of ours, one in California's
and the other in Vanderbilt's law review, both arguing for limitations on hate
speech against racial and sexual minorities and women, Professor Calleros
charges that we have given inadequate attention to counterspeech as a
possible remedy. Citing examples from Stanford and his own university,
Calleros shows how talking back in an effort to raise consciousness
empowered the minority victims of hate speech and educated the campus
community-all this without resorting to constitutionally troublesome and
heavy-handed disciplinary procedures.
Nothing that we said in either of the two articles causes us to disagree
with Professor Calleros. Talking back sometimes works. We would just
note two reservations. The first is that the talking back solution puts the
onus on young minority undergraduates to redress the harm of hate speech.
This is a burden to them, one they must shoulder in addition to getting their
own educations. In other words, in addition to educating themselves, they
must educate the entire campus community, and do so every time a racial
incident takes place.
Second, it would be a serious mistake for Professor Calleros' readers to
generalize from his sunny and optimistic experience. Not every setting is as
progressive, supportive, and loving as A.S.U. and Stanford University.
Some campuses do not enjoy a strong norm of civility or respect for people
* Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado. J.D., University of
California-Berkeley, 1974.
** Member of the Colorado Bar. J.D., University of Colorado, 1993. We gratefully
acknowledge the suggestions and assistance of Jean Stefancic and Bonnie Kae Grover in preparing
this essay.
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of color. And this is certainly true of hundreds of noneducational
institutions, such as the military, fraternities, and certain sport teams. And it
is even more true of the many ugly street encounters minorities suffer daily.
In many of these settings, talking back is not an option. In others, it would
be foolhardy, because of the imbalance of power. Ivory tower academics
must be careful of generalizing from one or two experiences in which
speech-their favorite mechanism-seemingly has worked. The social
history of pornography and hate speech in the United States argues for
caution, and for a multitude of approaches, not just one.
In general, we believe that traditional defenders of free speech must
beware of the tendency to light upon a single solution to a complex problem.
The purpose of this essay is to explore a type of unitary or essentialist
thinking that we find prevalent in First Amendment absolutist circles.
Although we welcome Calleros' article, we think that it has overtones of this
simplistic one-size-fits-all approach. It is in the hope that the future
discussion of hate speech will someday exhibit the kind of nuance that we see
in other areas of constitutional law, for example equal protection, that we
write this essay.
INTRODUCTION
In The Brothers Karamazov, Aloysha, an impressionable young man,
visits his mother's grave, where he has an intense religious experience.1
Transformed, he declares, "I want to live for immortality, and I will accept
no compromise. " 2 Having discovered God-the most important thing in
life-nothing else matters to Aloysha. He enters a monastery, devotes
himself single-mindedly to his spiritual mentor, Father Zossima, 3 prays
fervently, counsels the young, rescues animals, and effects a reconciliation
between feuding schoolboys before the death of one of them.4
In many respects, the American Civil Liberties Union (the "ACLU") and
other free speech absolutists remind us of Aloysha. Until recently, they have
held the line in every case of a proposed free speech exception, invoking
such doctrines and shibboleths as: no content regulation; no viewpoint
regulation; speech is different from action; more speech is the cure for bad
1. FYODOR DOSTOYEVSKI, THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV 22 (Constance Garnett trans.,
Modem Lib. ed. 1950) (1880).
2. Id. at 26.
3. Id. at 29-30.
4. Id. at 189, 208-13, 653, 937-40.
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speech; and governmental censorship and self-aggrandizement are evils
always to be feared and avoided. 5
But as legal realism6  has arrived finally in First Amendment
jurisprudence, more than fifty years after its appearance in other areas of
law, sweeping aside the various mechanical doctrines and "tests" that
prevailed until recently, the ACLU and other First Amendment absolutists,
who much preferred matters the old way, have been shifting ground
somewhat. Nowhere is this shift more evident than with regulation of hate
speech and pornography. With the publication of a number of influential law
5. On free speech absolutism in general, or the ACLU position on hate speech and
pornography in particular, see Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961
SUP. CT. REV. 245; Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 374-77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(more speech, not suppression, is the solution for bad speech); Nadine Strossen, In the Defense of
Freedom and Equality: The American Civil Liberties Union Past, Present, and Future, 29 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 143 (1994); Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest
Proposal?, 1.990 DUKE L.J. 484 [hereinafter Strossen, Modest Proposal]; SAMUEL WALKER, HATE
SPEECH: THE HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN CONTROVERSY (1994); HENRY LOUIS GATES ET AL.,
SPEAKING OF RACE, SPEAKING OF SEX: HATE SPEECH, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
(1994); ARYEH NEIER, DEFENDING MY ENEMY (1979).
6. On legal realism in general, see Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L.
REV. 457 (1897); Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35
COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935); Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to
Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931). Legal realism swept the law in the early years of
this century, condemning to history the formalist view attributed to Christopher Langdell and
others, that law is a static, timeless science with one right answer for every question. E.g.,
ROBERTO M. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 92-94 (1975) (on formalism and the view of law
as a science). Realism holds that "the life of the law is experience," and that policy, wisdom,
commonsense, and personal and class loyalties affect judicial outcomes as much as syllogistic logic.
E.g., Elizabeth Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 13, 21-24 (D. Kairys ed., 2d ed. 1990).
7. See Richard Delgado, First Amendment Formalism Is Giving Way to First Amendment
Legal Realism, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 169 (1994) [hereinafter Delgado, Giving Way]; J. M.
Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990
DUKE L.J. 375; Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J.
1; Cass Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV 255 (1992); Fredrick Schauer, The First
Amendment as Ideology, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 853 (1992); Stanley Fish, Fraught with Death:
Skepticism, Progressivism and the First Amendment, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1061 (1993). First
Amendment legal realism recognizes that speech acts take place against a variety of backgrounds
and settings; that some acts are more valuable than others; that speaker, listener, forum, and the
message conveyed all count; and that all speech comes embedded in a complex of social practices,
meanings, and arrangements. See, e.g., Katherine Abrams, Creeping Absolutism and Moral
Impoverishment: The Case for Limits on Free Expression, in THE LIMITS OF EXPRESSION IN
AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL LIFE 1 (ACLS Occasional Paper, No. 22, 1993); CATHARINE A.
MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993); Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others:
A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1989); Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A
Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133
(1982) [hereinafter Delgado, Words That Wound].
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review articles and books8 and the handing down of a trio of decisions by the
United States and Canadian Supreme Courts, 9 properly drafted hate-speech
codes may well be found constitutional. But are they wise?10  Assured
formerly that formalistic categories and doctrines such as the prohibition
against content or viewpoint discrimination would hold, the ACLU and
others who oppose hate-speech rules have ignored these questions until
recently. Now, like an Aloysha beginning to doubt his faith, they are
starting to hedge their bets and to argue that even if hate speech rules are
constitutional, they are a poor idea and that colleges, universities, and other
institutions should not adopt them, even if they could. 1
In our previous work, we examined two sets of policy arguments that
opponents of hate speech rules have advanced.12 On the left, the ACLU and
others have put forward policy arguments based on paternalism. 13  These
include what we call the "pressure valve," 14 "reverse enforcement," 5 "best
friend," 16 and "talk back"1 7 arguments, all of which commonly insist that
hate speech rules would injure minorities, whether they know it or not, and
should be avoided. A second set of arguments characterizes the moderate or
8. E.g., Delgado, Giving Way, supra note 7; Balkin, supra note 7; Richard Delgado,
Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 343 (1991)
[hereinafter Delgado, Narratives in Collision]; Delgado, Words That Wound, supra note 7.
9. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S.Ct. 2194 (1993) (upholding penalty enhancement for
racially-motivated crimes); Regina v. Keegstra, 3 S.C.R. 697 (Can. 1990) (upholding hate speech
legislation); Regina v. Butler, 89 D.L.R.4th 449 (Can. 1992) (upholding antipornography
measures). The Canadian free speech charter provisions are patterned after the United States' First
Amendment.
10. See Richard Delgado, Foreword: Essay on Hate Speech, 82 CAL. L. REV. 847, 848
(1994) (raising this question).
11. See id.
12. Delgado, Words That Wound, supra note 7, at 172-79; Delgado, Narratives in Collision,
supra note 8, at 345-47; Delgado, Giving Way, supra note 7, at 169, 172; Richard Delgado & Jean
Stefancic, Pornography and Harm to Women: "No Empirical Evidence?" 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037,
1037-38 (1992); Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Hateful Speech, Loving Communities: Why
Our Notion of "A Just Balance" Changes So Slowly, 82 CAL. L. REV. 851, 851-53 (1994); Jean
Stefancic & Richard Delgado, A Shifting Balance: Freedom of Expression and Hate-Speech
Restriction, 78 IOWA L. REV. 737, 741-44 (1993) (Book Review) [hereinafter Stefancic & Delgado,
Shifting Balance]; Richard Delgado & David Yun, The Neoconservative Case Against Hate-Speech
Regulation-Lively, D'Souza, Gates, Carter, and the Toughlove Crowd, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1807,
1812-21 (1994) [hereinafter Delgado & Yun, Toughlove Crowd]; Richard Delgado & David Yun,
Pressure Valves and Bloodied Chickens. An Analysis of Paternalistic Objections to Hate-Speech
Regulation, 82 CAL. L. REV 871, 878-85 (1994) [hereinafter Delgado & Yun, Pressure Valves].
13. Delgado & Yun, Pressure Valves, supra note 12, at 877.
14. Id. at 878.
15. Id. at 880.
16. Id. at 881.
17. Id. at 883.
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neoconservative right. These include the following arguments: that
mobilizing against hate speech is a waste of time-minorities ought to have
better things to do;19 that hate speech is a useful bellwether that ought not be
driven underground; ° that running to the authorities every time one suffers a
minor indignity merely deepens victimization; 21 and that minorities ought to
toughen up or learn to talk back.22 Each of these arguments makes up what
we call the "toughlove" position, and each, like the ones the liberals offer,
has answers. Some are empirically groundless, others assume a social world
unlike the one we live in, and others are inconsistent with the values that we
hold. 3
Our purpose in this essay is to examine an argument that is neither
paternalistic, nor of the toughlove variety, but structural. This argument,
which is associated with the ACLU and those who take a relatively purist
position with respect to the First Amendment, holds that hate speech,
pornography, and similar forms of expression ought to be protected precisely
because they are unpopular. The speech we hate, it is said, must be
protected in order to safeguard that which we hold dear. 24 The only way to
assure protection of values that lie at the core of the First Amendment is to
25protect speech lying at its periphery. And this inevitably means protecting
unpopular speakers: Nazis, anti-Semites, the Ku Klux Klan, utterers of
campus hate speech, and promulgators of hard-core pornography .26
What can be said about this argument? As we will show in Part 1, it is
fairly often put forward by lawyers, legal commentators, special interest
groups, and even an occasional judge as a reason for protecting odious
speech. The argument takes two or three forms, each of which boils down
to the insistence that to protect speech of one sort, it is necessary to protect
another. The argument in all its guises, however, is paradoxical and
18. Delgado & Yun, Toughlove Crowd, supra note 12, at 1812.
19. Id. at 1812.
20. Id. at 1816.
21. Id. at 1818.
22. Id. at 1819; see also id. at 1815 ("Quixotic" argument: the campaign for hate-speech
reform is doomed because society will never accept any form of regulation).
23. Delgado & Yun, Pressure Valves, supra note 12, 878-85 (answering liberals' arguments);
Delgado & Yun, Toughlove Crowd, supra note 12, 1812-21 (answering neoconservatives'
arguments).
24. See infra part I (setting out this argument in greater detail).
25. For this reason, we will at times refer to the argument as the "periphery-center" one. At
other times we will refer to it as the "single-valued jurisprudence" or "totalistic" argument because
it assumes only one supreme value, speech. See infra part I (analyzing and assessing several
varieties of the argument).
26. E.g., NEIER, supra note 5; GATES ET AL., supra note 5 (collection of essays on the need
to defend Klansmen, cross-burners, Nazi marchers, and similar clients).
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groundless, for reasons we present in Part II. In Part III, we address how an
argument with so little foundation can be put forward with seeming sincerity
by otherwise intelligent people. We show that the argument's contradictions
disappear once one understands that hate speech today lies not at the
periphery, but at the center, and that political speech lies at the periphery of
First Amendment ideology. The center and the periphery have traded places
in a second sense as well: In a striking reversal of Harry Kalven's thesis,
injuries to whites are now placed at the fore of constitutional jurisprudence,
with redress to blacks' historical injustices allowed only when it coincides
with benefits to whites. 27
I. SINGLE-VALUED JURISPRUDENCE: EXAMPLES IN COMMENTARY AND
JUDICIAL OPINIONS
As we indicated, the "speech we hate" (core-periphery) argument has
been put forward by commentators, including ones associated with special
interest groups like the ACLU, as well as by a few courts. In no case has
anyone attempted to argue for its truth or validity; instead, it has been
repeated as though a kind of mantra: We must protect X in order to protect
Y.
28
27. See infra part III at notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
28. Most commentators who advance the argument simply assert some version of it (such as
the slippery slope), without much support (for example, by showing why this particular slope is
slippery). E.g., NEIER, supra note 5, at 5 (asserting that Jews need a strong First Amendment and
thus that hate speech should flow freely). LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY:
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA (1986) comes closest to providing
support. In a study of extremist (but not hate) speech, Bollinger identifies a number of mechanisms
that might be supposed to connect the protection of extremist speech with protection of a central
core of political speech (e.g., id. at 12-42, examining the idea that a per se rule protects against
inadvertent encroachment on core speech functions; id. at 43-75, evaluating the claim that distrust
of government argues against any form of regulation; id. at 76-103, examining the "fortress" model
of First Amendment protection). JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 19 (1882) puts forward the
idea that speech must be broadly protected because what is thought error today may become
tomorrow's truth. See infra notes 90-108 and accompanying text (proposing that something similar
may be taking place today regarding hate speech).
Other possibilities occur to us-that defending low-value, peripheral hate speech, a difficult
exercise, keeps one fit and on one's toes (the overload principle); that defending peripheral speech
will inculcate a general attitude of toleration among the citizenry so that all speech will flourish (the
toleration argument, see BOLLINGER, supra at 104-44); that, as in horticulture, attention to the
periphery will cause the central core to be healthier (the pruning principle); that seeing others speak
vigorously about "other" subjects will teach and encourage minorities to "talk back" to the hate
speaker (the trickle-down theory) and thus the periphery will in time be no different from the core;
and that speech is everywhere the same, and that therefore there is no core or periphery (the
Platonic view of speech as essential, timeless, and devoid of contextual nuance or conditioning).
Most of these hypothetical arguments for the principle of protecting the periphery have easy
1286
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A. The Commentators' and Special Interest Groups'Argument
The argument that we must protect the speech we hate in order to protect
that which we hold dear is a special favorite of certain commentators,
especially those connected with the ACLU and other groups that advocate an
unfettered First Amendment. Samuel Walker, for example, the author of a
recent history of the ACLU and another of the hate speech controversy,
writes that the ACLU believes that "every view, no matter how ignorant or
harmful we may regard it, has a legal and moral right to be heard." 30  He
explains that banning ignorant and hateful propaganda against Jews, for
instance, "could easily lead to the suppression of other ideas now regarded
as moderate and legitimate." The free speech victories that have been won
in defending Nazi and other unpopular speech, Walker points out, also have
been used to protect pro-civil rights messages. 32
In two recent books and a series of law review articles, Nadine Strossen,
the president of the ACLU, echoes Walker's views. "If the freedom of
speech is weakened for one person, group, or message," according to
Strossen, we soon will have no free speech rights at all.33 Thus, for
example, "the effort to defend freedom for those who choose to create, pose
for, or view 'pornography' is not only freedom for this particular type of
expression, but also freedom of expression in general." 
34
In the recently published Speaking of Race, Speaking of Sex: Hate
Speech, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties, Anthony Griffin and Henry Louis
Gates advance positions similar to Strossen's. Gates writes that when the
ACLU defends the right of neo-Nazis to march in Skokie, a predominantly
Jewish suburb of Chicago where a number of Holocaust survivors live, it
does so to protect and fortify the constitutional right of free speech. 35 If free
answers, and in any event except for the ones mentioned in the first paragraph of this note, are not
put forward-to our knowledge, at any rate-by the argument's proponents.
29. SAMUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES: A HISTORY OF THE ACLU
(1990).
30. SAMUEL WALKER, HATE SPEECH: THE HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN CONTROVERSY 20;
see also id. at 165-67 (1994).
31. Id. at 20.
32. Id. at 160. For example, the ACLU defended the right of Father Terminiello, a
suspended Catholic priest, to give a racist speech in Chicago. The United States Supreme Court
agreed with the ACLU in a landmark decision. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
Walker writes that the ACLU and other civil rights groups in the 1960s and 1970s were able to
defend free speech rights of civil rights demonstrators by relying on Terminiello. WALKER, supra
note 30, at 105-108.
33. GATES ET AL., supra note 5, at 212.
34. Nadine Strossen, A Feminist Critique of "The" Feminist Critique of Pornography, 79 VA.
L. REV. 1099, 1171 (1993).
35. GATES ET AL., supra note 5, at 6.
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speech can be tested and upheld to protect even Nazi speech, "then the
precedent will make it that much stronger in all the less obnoxious cases. "
36
Griffin, who forfeited his position with the Texas NAACP in order to defend
a Klan organization, reiterates the ACLU position through a series of three
fables, all of which reinforce the notion that the only way to have a strong,
vibrant First Amendment is to protect Nazi speech, racist speech, and so
on. 37  Otherwise, the periphery will collapse and the government
increasingly will regulate speech that we regard as central to our system of
politics and government.
This type of argument is not just the favorite of the ACLU and civil
libertarians. Respected constitutional commentators have employed the same
periphery-to-center reasoning as well. Lee Bollinger, for instance, posits
that Nazi speech should be protected not because people should value their
message or believe that it should be seriously entertained, but because
protection of such speech reinforces our society's commitment to tolerance.39
Laurence Tribe explains that there is no principled basis for regulating
speech based on content or viewpoint. For "[i]f the Constitution forces
government to allow people to march, speak, and write in favor of peace,
brotherhood, and justice, then it must also require.government to allow them
to advocate hatred, racism, and even genocide."4u As stated by these and
other commentators, then, the "speech we hate" argument takes on a small
number of variants. Some argue that there must be a wall around the
periphery to protect the speech that we hold dear. Others reason that speech
that lies at the periphery must be protected if we are to strengthen impulses
or principles, such as tolerance, that are important to society.
B. The Courts' Argument
Many years ago, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes laid the groundwork for
the periphery-to-center reasoning by declaring that, "[I]f there is any
principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than
any other, it is the principle of free thought-not free thought for those who
36. Id.
37. Id. at 257-79.
38. Id.
39. Lee C. Bollinger, The Skokie Legacy: Reflections on an "Easy Case" and Free Speech
Theory, 80 MICH. L. REV. 617, 629-31 (1982); BOLLINGER, supra note 28, at 125-33; see NEIER,
supra note 5, at 5 (making same general argument in case of Jews, who are in special need of an
unfettered First Amendment).
40. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-8, at 838 n. 17 (2d ed.
1988).
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agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate." 4 1 He urged that
"we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of
opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death" if we are to
42
preserve the free competition of ideas.
Later, in Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Supreme Court issued a ringing
defense of an unfettered right of free speech. In vindicating the Ku Klux
Klan's right to express hatred and violence toward Jews and blacks, the
Court held that unless the Klan's speech is likely to incite imminent lawless
action, our Constitution has made such speech immune from governmental
control.43 And in the famous "Nazis in Skokie" case, the Seventh Circuit's
opinion reverberated with Justice Holmes' reasoning. 44 In upholding the
neo-Nazi's right to march in that city, the Seventh Circuit wrote that its
result was dictated by the fundamental proposition that if free speech is to
remain vital for all, courts must protect not only speech that our society
deems acceptable, but also that which it justifiably rejects and despises.45
Courts, then, make some of the same versions of the core-periphery
argument that commentators do. A few hold that without protection for
speech we hate, there will be no free marketplace of ideas. One or two
further urge that in order to protect speech that our society finds acceptable
we must also protect speech that we find repugnant. The argument in each
of its guises is essentially the same: To protect the most central, important
forms of speech-political and artistic speech, and so on-we must protect
the most repugnant, valueless forms including hate speech directed against
minorities and degrading pornographic stereotypes of women.
II. SEVEN PROBLEMS WITH THE EXTREME-CASE, OR "SPEECH WE HATE"
ARGUMENT
As we have seen, the extreme-case argument is rarely if ever defended or
justified. Rather, its supporters put it forward as an article of faith, without
41. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654-55 (1929).
42. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919); see Schenk v. United States, 249
U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (holding that speech is only subject to prohibition when it is "used in such
circumstances and [is] of such a nature as to create clear and present danger that will bring about
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent").
43. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1969); see also Communist Party v.
Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 137 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) ("freedoms of
speech ... must be accorded to the ideas we hate or sooner or later they will be denied to the ideas
we cherish"); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 22 (1971) (even "scurrilous speech" must receive
protection).
44. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978).
45. Id. at 1210.
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reason or support, as though it were self-evidently true. But not only is it
not self-evidently true, it stands on a very weak footing.
A. Lack of Empirical Support
If protecting hate speech and pornography were essential to safeguarding
freedom of inquiry and a flourishing democratic politics, we would expect to
find that nations that have adopted hate speech rules and curbs against
pornography would suffer quickly a sharp erosion of the spirit of free
46inquiry. But this has not happened. A host of industrialized nations,
including Sweden, Italy, Canada, and Great Britain, have instituted laws
against hate speech and hate propaganda, 47 in many cases to comply with
international treaties and conventions requiring such action. 48 Many of these
countries traditionally respect free speech at least as much as the United
States does.49 No such nation has reported any erosion of the atmosphere of
free speech or debate.
50
At the same time, the United States, which until recently has refused to
put such rules into effect, has a less than perfect record of protecting even
political speech. United States agencies have persecuted communists,
5 1
hounded Hollywood writers out of the country, 52 and harassed and badgered
such civil rights leaders as Josephine Baker,53 Paul Robeson,54 and W. E. B.
DuBois 55 in a campaign of personal and professional smears that ruined their
reputations and destroyed their ability to earn a living. In recent times,
conservatives inside and outside the Administration have disparaged
progressives to the point where many are now afraid to describe themselves
46. See Stefancic & Delgado, Shifting Balance, supra note 12, at 742; Delgado, Narratives in
Collision, supra note 8, at 371-72.
47. Stefancic & Delgado, Shifting Balance, supra note 12, at 741-44 (countries that have
adopted reforms); Delgado, Narratives in Collision, supra note 8, at 364-71.
48. Stefancic & Delgado, Shifting Balance, supra note 12, at 739; Delgado, Narratives in
Collision, supra note 8 at 362-64.
49. Stefancic & Delgado, Shifting Balance, supra note 12, at 742-43.
50. Id. at 742; Delgado, Narratives in Collision, supra note 8 at 371.
51. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
52. On the infamous "Hollywood blacklist" and resulting exodus to Mexico and other
countries by U.S. writers unable to obtain work, see JOHN COYLEY, REPORT ON BLACKLISTING
(1956).
53. Mary L. Dudziak, Josephine Baker, Racial Protest and the Cold War, 81 J. AM. HIST.
543 (1994).
54. MARTIN B. DUBERMAN, PAUL ROBESON (1988); SHIRLEY GRAHAM, PAUL ROBESON:
CITIZEN OF THE WORLD (1971).
55. GERALD HORNE, BLACK AND RED: W.E.B. DUBOIS AND THE AFRO-AMERICAN
RESPONSE TO THE COLD WAR, 1944-1963 (1986).
1290 [Ariz. St. L.J.
"THE SPEECH WE HATE"
as "liberals." 56 Controversial artists are denied federal funding. 57 Museum
exhibits that depict the atomic bombing of Hiroshima have been ordered
modified. 58 If political speech lies at the center of the First Amendment, its
protection seems to be largely independent of what is taking place at the
periphery. There may, indeed, be an inverse correlation. Those institutions
most concerned with social fairness have proved to be the ones most likely to
promulgate anti-hate speech rules. 59  Part of the reason seems to be the
recognition that hate speech can easily silence and demoralize its victims,
discouraging them from participating in the life of the institution. 60  If so,
enacting hate speech rules may be evidence of a commitment to democratic
dialogue, rather than the opposite, as some of its opponents maintain.
B. A Paradoxical-and Highly Questionable-Metaphor
A second reason why we ought to distrust the core-periphery argument is
that it rests on a paradoxical metaphor that its proponents rarely if ever
explain or justify. 6  Suppose, for example, that one were in the business of
supplying electricity to a region. One has competitors-private utility
companies, suppliers of gas heaters, and so on. Ninety-nine percent of one's
business consists of supplying electricity to homes and businesses, but the
business also supplies a small amount of electricity to teenagers to recharge
the batteries of their Walkmans. It would surely be a strange business
decision to focus all or much of one's advertising campaign on the much
smaller account. Or, take a more legal example. Protecting human security
is surely a core value for the police. Yet, it would be a peculiar distribution
of police services if a police chief were to reason: human life is the core
value which we aim to protect; therefore, we will devote the largest
proportion of our resources toward apprehending shoplifters and loiterers.
56. On the recent right-wing barrage that has put liberals on the defensive, see Richard
Delgado, Stark Karst, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1460 (1995) (Book Review).
57. On the controversy over the National Endowment for the Arts, which has funded
controversial artists like Mapplethorpe, see, e.g., Robert Pear, Alexander Makes Case for Arts
Endowment, NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 27, 1995, at C1.
58. Mike Feinsilber, Museum Cancels A-Bomb Exhibit, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Jan. 31,
1995, at Al.
59. Delgado, Narratives in Collision, supra note 8, at 349-58, 387 n.354 (on the way
universities and colleges established hate-speech rules in response to racist incidents).
60. On the way in which hate speech can easily do this, see, e.g., Delgado, Narratives in
Collision, supra note 8, at 387 n.354; Frank Michelman, Response to Cass Sunstein, in THE PRICE
WE PAY: THE CASE AGAINST HATE SPEECH AND PORNOGRAPHY (Laura Lederer & Richard
Delgado eds., 1995).
61. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (argument generally asserted as a matter of
faith).
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There are situations in which the core-periphery argument does make
sense. Providing military defense of a territory may be one; ecology, where
protecting lizards may be necessary in order to protect hawks, may be
another. But ordinarily, the suggestion that to protect a value or thing at its
most extreme reaches is necessary in order to protect it at its core requires,
at the very least, an explanation or some offer of a connection. Yet,
62defenders of hate speech who deploy this argument have not provided one.
And, in the meantime, a weak argument does great harm. It treats in grand,
exalted terms the harm of suppressing racist speech, drawing illegitimate
support from the broad social justification-social dialogue among citizens.
63
In contrast, the harm to hate speech's victims, out on the periphery, is
treated atomistically, as though it were an isolated event, a one-time-only
affront to feelings. An injury characterized in act utilitarian terms
65obviously cannot trump an interest couched in rule utilitarian ones. The
Nazi, for example, derives a halo effect from other quite legitimate and
valuable cases of speech, while the black is seen as a lone, quirky grievant
with hypersensitive feelings. 66  But, in reality, hate speech is part of a
concerted set of headwinds, including many other cases of hate speech, that
a particular African-American victim will experience over the course of his
67or her life. If we are willing to defend speech in broad social terms, we
should be able to consider systemic, concerted harms as well.
The "speech we hate" argument draws plausibility only by ignoring this
asymmetry: it draws on a social good to justify an evil deemed only
individual, but which in fact is concerted and society-wide. The unfairness
of collapsing the periphery and the center as absolutists do would be made
clear if we rendered the argument: "We protect the speech they hate in
order to protect that which we love." But not only is the argument unfair in
this sense, it ignores what makes hate speech peripheral as speech in the first
place. Face to face hate speech-slurs, insults, put-downs, and epithets-are
62. For our attempt to provide a number of possibilities, see supra note 28.
63. See Thomas Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J.
877, 878-86 (1963) (setting out the underlying rationales of the First Amendment).
64. E.g., Strossen, Modest Proposal, supra note 5 (terming the effect of hate speech a mere
"anxiety" at 492, "offensive" at 497, "unpleasant" at 499, or "harmful" at 533).
65. Rule utility justifies rules and principles by reason of the good (or evil) they produce; act
utility judges the consequences of individual acts.
66. See supra note 64; see also GATES ET AL., supra note 5, at 15-16, 62-63, 72 (controversy
overblown, injury to victims exaggerated).
67. Delgado, Narratives in Collision, supra note 8, at 383-84.
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not referential. The recipient learns nothing new about himself or herself.
68
Rather, the speech elements are more like performatives, relocating the
speaker and victim in social reality. Hate speech is not about the real, but
the hyperreal; a Willie Horton ad is like an ad about jeans that makes no
factual claim but merely shows a woman and a car.
69
C. Mistaking Principles for People
There is one setting in which it makes good sense to argue from the
extreme, or peripheral, case, namely where human beings, as opposed to
abstract principles, are concerned. For example, one sometimes hears that
the test of a civilized society is the degree of protection it affords its least
privileged, most despised members. Thus, prison reformers argue that a
society that locks up and warehouses prisoners under crowded and inhumane
conditions with little opportunity for recreation, acquisition of jobs skills, or
rehabilitation is not deserving of the term civilized. Similarly, society is
deemed uncivilized in its treatment of the mentally ill, juvenile offenders, the
mentally retarded, and the desperately poor. Here, what we do at the
periphery does say something about the way society values qualities like
compassion, forgiveness, and the fair distribution of resources. But people
(unlike abstract principles) retain their value, retain their distinctive nature,
even at the furthest reaches. Human beings are always ends in themselves-
there is no continuum of humanness 7 But our Constitutional system
recognizes not one, but many values. 71 As we shall demonstrate, the nature
and structure of our jurisprudence mean that we cannot treat principles, not
even the First Amendment, in that fashion.
D. The Nature of Constitutional Continuums
Every periphery is another principle's core; that is the nature of a
72multivalent constitutional system like ours. Principles limit other ones:
X's right to privacy limits Y's right to freedom of action, and so on. Indeed,
the idea of a constitutional principle, like free speech, that has a core and a
68. For example, "Nigger, get off this campus. Go back to Africa" conveys no new
information, since the target obviously knows that (1) he is African-American, (2) his ancestors
come from that continent, and (3) some individuals on campus hate him and wish he were not there.
69. See, e.g., JEAN BAUDRILLARD, SIMULATIONS (1983) (on the real and the hyperreal in
linguistic theory).
70. It is a principle of Kantian, as well as Judeo-Christian, ethics that human beings are
valued not instrumentally-for what they can produce-but because of their value in themselves.
71. For example, privacy, property rights, the exercise of religion, the equal protection of the
law, freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures, and from being enslaved.
72. See supra note 71.
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periphery would be incoherent without the existence of other values (such as
privacy or reputation) to generate the limit that accounts for the idea of a
periphery. Thus, commercial and defamatory speech, which have a lesser
degree of constitutional protection than political speech, are subject to limits
not because they are not speech at all, but because they implicate other
values that we hold .7  And the same is true of speech that constitutes a
threat, provokes a fight, defrauds customers, or divulges an official secret.
All these and dozens of other "exceptions" to the First Amendment74 are
peripheral, and subject to limits, precisely because they reflect other
principles, such as security, reputation, peace, and privacy. To argue, then,
that speech must be protected at the most extreme case even more
assiduously than when its central values are at stake is either to
misunderstand the nature of a constitutional continuum, or to argue that the
Constitution in effect has only one value.
E. Violation of the Principle of Dialogic Politics
Moreover, to argue in such fashion is to violate a principle that is
inherent in our constitutional structure and jurisprudence: the principle of
dialogic politics. 75  Law has not one value, but many. Jones wants the
privacy of a ten-foot fence; Smith wants more light in his living room. The
district attorney wants the ability to protect the community from offenders;
all citizens have an interest in not being randomly seized, frisked, and
searched. A wants to speak. B does not wish to be defamed. In situations
of competing values, judges "balance" the principles, trying6 to fashion a
solution that gives the appropriate weight to each principle. Courts are
guided by lawyers and briefs arguing both sides of the case, as well as case
law showing how the rights are to be balanced. Inherent in this process is
73. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 40, §§ 12-12 to 12-13, 12-15, § 12-18, at 931-34, § 12-36,
at 1046-47.
74. For a discussion of these so-called exceptions, see Delgado, Narratives in Collision,
supra note 8, at 377.
75. The term is our own. But it reflects the underlying values of neorepublicanism, the idea
that deliberation by the citizenry lies at the heart of our system of law and politics. See, e.g., Frank
Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1503-07 (1988); Cass Sunstein, Beyond the
Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine
Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543, 555-57 (1986). Although a powerful
political idea, neorepublicanism is not without its defects, see Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Fifth
Chronicle: Civitas, Civil Wrongs, and the Politics of Denial, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1581, 1595-98
(1993).
76. On the ubiquitous balancing test and its appearance in many areas of constitutional law,
see TRIBE, supra note 40, § 10-18, at 457, §§ 12-2, 12-19, § 12-24, at 987, § 12-33, § 14-13, at
1251-55.
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what we call "dialogic politics," the commonsense notion that in cases where
interests and values conflict, people and principles (through their defenders,
of course) ought to be made to talk to each other. In close cases, judges
ought to heed both sides; lawyers representing polar views ought to be made
to respond to each other's arguments.
But the totalist view admits of no compromise: One's favorite principle
remains supreme everywhere it has a bearing, no matter how slight. This
means that one is not obliged to talk to those other persons, not obliged to
address those other values. If the whole purpose of the First Amendment is
77to facilitate a system of dialogue and compromise, this is surely a
paradoxical view for a defender of the First Amendment to take.
F. Totalism Versus Totalism: When Extremism Cancels Itself Out
Every totalist argument is indeterminate, because it can be countered
easily by an opposite and equally powerful countervailing totalism. To
continue with the hate speech example, imagine that someone (say, the
NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund) argued in the following
fashion: (1) Equality is a constitutional value; (2) the only way effectively to
promote equality is to assure that it is protected everywhere; (3) therefore,
whenever equality collides with another value, such as free speech, equality
must prevail. "We must protect the equality we hate, as much as that which
we hold dear." Now we would have two values, the defenders of which are
equally convinced that their own value should reign supreme. Each regards
the other's periphery as unworthy of protection. To be sure, balancing may
be troublesome because it can disguise the political value judgments a judge
makes on his or her way to a decision. 78 But totalism is worse-it gives the
possessor permission not even to enter the realm of politics at all. At least,
balancing encourages the decisionmaker to be aware and take into account
the various values and interests at stake in a controversy. With totalism, one
has no need to compromise or consider the other side. One finds oneself
outside the realm of politics, and instead, inside that of sheer power.
77. See Emerson, supra note 63, at 878-86.
78. This is a frequent criticism of balancing, viz., that it is tantamount to the judge's making
a thinly disguised value judgment. On the notion that legal reasoning is indeterminate-disguised
politics-see generally Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in THE
POLITICS OF LAW 40 (D. Kairys ed. 1978); Mark G. Kelman, Trashing, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 293
(1984).
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G. First Amendment Romanticism Versus the Social Construction of Racial
Reality
With hate speech and pornography, heeding the ACLU's totalist
argument introduces special dangers of its own. Hate speech lies at the
periphery of the First Amendment, as the proponents of the totalist argument
quickly concede. Yet the reason why hate speech does so is that it implicates
the interest of another group, minorities, in not being defamed, reviled,
stereotyped, insulted, badgered, and harassed. Permitting a large number of
social actors to portray a relatively powerless social group in this fashion
helps construct a stigma-picture or stereotype that describes members of the
79second group as lascivious, lazy, carefree, immoral, stupid, and so on.
This stereotype guides action, making life much more difficult for minorities
in transactions that clearly matter: getting a job, renting an apartment,
hailing a cab. 80 But it also diminishes the credibility of minority speakers,
inhibiting their ability to have their points of view taken seriously, in politics
or anywhere else-surely a result that is at odds with the First Amendment
and the marketplace of ideas. 81 This is an inevitable consequence of treating
peripheral regions of a value as entitled to the same weight we afford that
value when it is centrally implicated: We convey the impression that those
other values-the ones responsible for the continuum in the first place-are
of little worth. And when those other values are central to the social
construction of a human being or social group, 82 the dangers of undervaluing
their interests increase sharply. Their interests are submerged today-in the
valuing a court or decisionmaker is asked to perform. And their interests are
submerged in the future, because they are thereafter the bearers of a stigma,
one which means they need not be taken fully into account in future
deliberations. 83 Permitting one social group to speak disrespectfully of
another habituates and encourages speakers to continue speaking that way in
the future. 84  The way of speaking becomes normalized, inscribed in
79. On the construction and great staying power of these and similar stereotypes, see, e.g.,
Richard Delgado & Jean Stefar.cic, Images of the Outsider in American Life and Culture: Can Free
Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1258 (1992) [hereinafter Delgado &
Stefancic, Images].
80. Id. at 1275-88; Delgado, Narratives in Collision, supra note 8, at 383-84.
81. Delgado & Stefancic, Images, supra note 79 at 1287; Delgado, Narratives in Collision,
supra note 8, at 384-85.
82. See Delgado & Stefancic, Images, supra note 79, at 1277.
83. Id. at 1261-77, 1287.
84. Id. at 1279-88; Delgado, Words That Wound, supra note 7.
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hundreds of plots, narratives, and scripts; it becomes part of culture, what
everyone knows.
85
The reader may wish to reflect on changes he or she surely has observed
over the last fifteen years or so. During the civil rights era of the sixties and
early seventies, African-Americans and other minorities were spoken of
respectfully. Then, beginning in the late seventies and eighties, racism was
spoken in code. Now, however, op-ed columns, letters to the editor, and
political speeches deride and blame them outspokenly. Antiminority
sentiment need no longer be spoken in code but can be proclaimed outright.
We have changed our social construct of the black from unfortunate victim
and brave warrior to welfare leeches, unwed mothers, criminals, and
untalented low-IQ affirmative action beneficiaries who take away jobs from
more talented and deserving whites. The slur, sneer, ethnic joke, and most
especially face-to-face hate speech are the main vehicles that have made this
change possible.
III. THE CORE-PERIPHERY ARGUMENT AND HATE SPEECH: WHY THE
ARGUMENT RETAINS ITS APPEAL
As we have seen, the extreme case (or core-periphery) argument rests on
an unexamined, paradoxical metaphor.86 It adopts a view of the Constitution
and of dialogue that is at odds with the one we hold. 87 It mistakenly treats
subordinate principles as though they were people and ends in themselves.
88
It treats the interests of minorities as though they were of little weight, or as
fully protected by merely protecting speech. 89 It ignores the experience of
other industrialized nations that have instituted hate-speech reforms without
injurious consequences. What accounts for its rhetorical attraction and
staying power? We believe that the principal reason is that hate speech and
pornography today do not lie at the periphery of the First Amendment, as the
ACLU and other advocates urge, but at its center.
In former times, society was much more structured. Citizens knew their
places. Women and blacks understood that they were not the equals of white
men-the Constitution formally excluded them 91-and coercive social and
85. Delgado & Stefancic, Images, supra note 79, at 1275-82.
86. See supra part II.B.
87. See supra part lI.D.
88. See supra part II.C.
89. See supra part II.B.
90. See supra part II.A.
91. See DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 26-30 (3d ed. 1992).
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legal power reminded them if they were ever tempted to step out of line. 92 It
was unnecessary to reinforce this constantly-an occasional reminder would
do. 93  Today, however, the formal mechanisms that maintained status and




Hate speech has replaced formal slavery, Jim Crow laws, female
subjugation, and Japanese internment as a means to keep outsider groups in
line. In former times, political speech was indeed the center of the First
Amendment. 96 Citizens (white, property-owning males, at any rate) took a
lively interest in politics. They spoke, debated, wrote tracts, and
corresponded with each other about how the Republic ought to be
governed.97  They did not speak much about whether women were men's
equals, should be allowed to hold jobs or vote, whether blacks were the
equals of whites, because this was not necessary-the very ideas were
practically unthinkable.
98
Today, the situation is reversed. Few Americans vote, or can even name
their representative in Washington. 99  Politics has deteriorated to a once-
every-four-years ritual of attack ads, catch phrases, sound bites, and image
manicuring. 100 At the same time, however, politics in the sense of jockeying
for social position has greatly increased in intensity and virulence. Males
are anxious and fearful of advances by women; 10 1 whites fear crime and
vengeful behavior from blacks and other minorities; and so on. 102  Hate
speech today is a central weapon in the struggle by the empowered to
92. Id. at 30-36.
93. It was not necessary, in other words, to beat, threaten, or lynch every African-American.
Only an occasional such act was necessary, because every black knew of the system that supported
or winked at such terroristic acts, and was thus constantly aware that he or she could easily become
the next victim if he or she committed what the system considered a transgression.
94. For example, the Thirteenth Amendment repeals slavery, the Fourteenth guarantees equal
protection of the law, the Fifteenth voting rights, and a panoply of federal and state statutes prohibit
discrimination in areas such as housing, public accommodation, employment, and education.
95. See Delgado & Stefancic, Images, supra note 79, at 1261-84 (for a similar thesis).
96. For the role of free speech in Enlightenment thought and politics, see Richard Delgado &
David Millen, God, Galileo and Government: Toward Constitutional Protection for Scientific
Inquiry, 53 WASH. L. REV. 349, 354-58 (1978).
97. Id. at 358-61.
98. See DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL
JUSTICE 26-50 (1987) (chronicle of the Constitutional Convention).
99. On Americans' striking ignorance of Washington and national politics, see, e.g., JAMES
FISKLIN, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION 57-64 (1991).
100. Id. at 63; see also PHYLLIS KANISE, MAKING LOCAL NEWS 110 (1990).
101. SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH (1990).
102. E.g., Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Eighth Chronicle: Black Crime, White Fears-On the
Social Construction of Threat, 80 VA. L. REV. 503 (1994).
1298 [Ariz. St. L.J.
"THE SPEECH WE HATE"
maintain their position in the face of formerly subjugated groups clamoring
for change. It is a means of disparaging the opposition while depicting one's
own resistance to sharing opportunities as principled and just. Formerly, the
First Amendment and free speech were used to make small adjustments
within a relatively peaceful political order consisting of propertied white
males. Now it is used to postpone macroadjustments and power-sharing
between that group and others: It is, in short, an instrument of majoritarian
identity politics. Nothing in the Constitution (at least in the emerging realist
view) requires that hate speech receive protection. But ruling elites are
unlikely to relinquish it easily, since it is an effective means of postponing
social change.
In the sixties, it was possible to believe Harry Kalven's optimistic
hypothesis that gains for blacks stemming from the gallant struggle for civil
rights would end up benefiting all of society. 0 3 It was true for a time, at
least, that the hard-won gains by a decade of civil rights struggle did broaden




Today, however, there has been a stunning reversal. Now, the reciprocal
injury-inhibition of the right to injure others-has been elevated to a central
place in First Amendment jurisprudence. 05 The injury-being muzzled
when one would otherwise wish to disparage, terrorize, or burn a cross on a
black family's lawn-is now depicted as a prime constitutional value. 106 The
interest convergence between black interests and broadened rights for whites
lasted but a short time. Now, the ACLU defends Aryan supremacists, while
maintaining that this is best for minorities, too. 107 Blanket resistance to hate-
speech regulations, which many college and university administrators are
trying to put into place in order to advance straightforward institutional
interests of their own-preserving diversity, teaching civility, preventing the
103. HARRY KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 6-7 (1966) (suggesting that
civil rights gains would benefit all of society, including whites); see also GATES ET AL., supra note
5, at 17.
104. For example, Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), strengthened due process rights in
school disciplinary cases for all students, black or white. A host of cases assured the rights of
peaceable assembly and protest. See, e.g., BELL, supra note 91, at 424-43 (discussing rights of
political protest).
105. E.g., Strossen, Modest Proposal, supra note 5; GATES ET AL., supra note 5, at 187-237
(arguing for strenuous resistance to reforms of hate speech law).
106. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 422-26 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(warning that the majority's opinion has turned First Amendment law on its head-fighting words
that were once entirely unprotected are now entitled to greater protection than commercial speech,
and possibly greater protection than core political speech).
107. On these paternalistic justifications for the current hate speech regime, see Delgado &
Yun, Pressure Valves, supra note 12 (examining six versions of this argument).
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loss of black undergraduates to other schoolsl°S--generates a great deal of
business for the ACLU and similar absolutist organizations.
In a sense, the ACLU and conservative bigots are hand-in-glove. Like
criminals and police, they understand each other's method of operation,
mentality, and objectives. There is a tacit understanding of how each shall
behave, and how each shall gain from the other. Indeed, primarily because
the Ku Klux Klan and similar clients are so bad, the ACLU gets to feel
romantic and virtuous °9-and the rest of us, who despise racism and
bigotry, are seen as benighted fools because we do not understand how the
First Amendment really works.
But we do. The bigot is not a stand-in for Tom Paine. The best way to
preserve lizards is not to preserve hawks. Reality is not paradoxical.
Sometimes, defending Nazis is simply defending Nazis.
108. Delgado, Narratives in Collision, supra note 8, at n.354.
109. See STEVE SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE (1990)
(First Amendment as romance). For a notable example of celebratory First Amendment
jurisprudence, see ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (1991).
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